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It is one thing for two or more persons to perceive the same object, and it is quite another for two 
or more persons to perceive the same object together. The latter phenomenon is called joint 
attention and has recently garnered considerable interest from psychologists. However, 
contemporary psychological research has not succeeded in clarifying how persons can share 
perception of an object. Joint attention thus stands in need of phenomenological clarification. 
Surprisingly, this has yet to be offered. Phenomenologists have provided thoroughgoing analyses 
of perceptual experience, but have overlooked the perceptual experiences of co-perceivers; and, 
while a number of well-known phenomenologists have offered accounts of how one encounters 
other persons, they have neglected the phenomenon of perceptually attending to an object with 
other persons. This paper addresses a shortcoming of both contemporary psychological research 




Once, while on an otherwise uneventful hike in 
British Columbia, my companion and I chanced to 
cross paths with a brown bear. It approached the trail 
through brush, breaking small branches along the 
way. I heard my companion say “Bear! Bear! Bear!” 
in a hushed but increasingly urgent tone. “I know,” I 
said, “Let’s just keep walking away from it at the 
same pace.” Her utterance had not drawn my attention 
to the bear. It was a very large and not especially 
stealthy animal, so it already had my attention. But 
her words and my response established what psycho-
logists call joint attention. We saw the bear together 
and, on the basis of our shared perception, we were 
able to take what turned out to be effective action. 
 
Joint attention has recently garnered considerable 
interest among psychologists. Current research 
indicates that joint attention is uncommon among 
non-human animals, whereas humans typically begin 
to engage in some rudimentary form of joint attention 
at about the age of twelve months (Eilan, 2005). Joint 
attention appears to play a crucial role in the 
acquisition of linguistic competence (Sabbagh & 
Baldwin, 2005), and it is clearly a basis for many co-
operative activities. Some researchers have argued 
that joint attention episodes allow human beings to 
pool cognitive resources and thereby create species- 
specific features of human life such as natural 
languages and complex institutions (Tomasello & 
Rakoczy, 2003). The psychological literature has not, 
however, succeeded in clarifying how persons jointly 
attend to an object. Focused on identifying 
developmental antecedents and consequences of joint 
attention, psychologists have not provided a 
satisfactory account of how perception can be shared.  
 
Joint attention thus stands in need of 
phenomenological clarification. Surprisingly, this has 
yet to be offered. Phenomenologists have provided 
detailed analyses of perceptual experience, and, as 
Dan Zahavi has rightly asserted, no other 
philosophical tradition has been more concerned with 
the nature of intersubjectivity (2008, p. 148). But 
phenomenological analyses of perception have 
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focused on perceptual experiences of a single 
perceiver rather than on those of co-perceivers, and 
phenomenology of intersubjectivity has focused on 
how one person encounters other persons rather than 
on how one person perceptually attends to an object 
with others. 
 
This paper thus addresses a shortcoming of both 
contemporary psychological research and the tradition 
of phenomenology by offering a phenomenology of 
joint attention. The first section reviews elementary 
Husserlian phenomenology and introduces a system 
for symbolically representing the structure of 
intentional mental states. The second section 
summarizes Edith Stein’s phenomenological 
description of empathy, the intentional mental state in 
which one is directly aware of other persons. The 
third section brings these resources to bear on the 
problem of joint attention. I begin by clarifying 
Alfred Schutz’s analysis of the face-to-face situation, 
and then extend his analysis to cases involving a third 
element, a jointly perceived object. The final section 
considers and responds to a number of objections that 




As Husserl explains in Ideas Pertaining to Pure 
Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philo-
sophy (1913/1983), phenomenology is a theory of 
intentional mental states. A mental state is intentional 
insofar as it is about some object. The perceptual 
experience I have of my desktop fan is thus an 
intentional state, as is my appreciation of the beauty 
of a Klein bike frame or my judgment that the sum of 
two and three is five. In the Logical Investigations 
(1900-1901/2001) Husserl called these mental states 
“acts”, but in Ideas he prefers to call them “noeses”. 
 
Every noesis has a number of distinct parts. The thetic 
character of a noesis is the part by virtue of which it 
falls into one or another psychological category such 
as perception, judgment, memory or imagination. 
Every noesis also has a noetic component, a part by 
virtue of which it is about an object. More precisely, 
this is the part by virtue of which a noesis is about an 
object under some description. On my otherwise 
uneventful hike in British Columbia, I did not see just 
an object. I saw an object as fitting the description 
“brown bear making its way toward the trail”. I saw 
the object under this description by virtue of the 
noetic component of my perceptual act. Noeses of the 
same thetic character can have noetic components of 
different types, as is the case with perception of a 
desktop fan and perception of a Klein bike frame. 
Conversely, noeses with noetic components of the 
same type can differ in thetic character, as is the case 
with perception of an especially dry cappuccino and 
memory of an especially dry cappuccino.  
Phenomenological theory uses noematic descriptions 
to identify the noetic components of intentional 
mental states. As explained above, the noetic 
component of a noesis is that part by virtue of which 
the noesis is about an object under some description. 
A noematic description identifies the noetic 
component by articulating the description under 
which the object falls. “Brown bear making its way 
toward the trail” would thus be a noematic 
description, as would “desktop fan”, “Klein bike 
frame” and “especially dry cappuccino.”  
 
Linguistic expressions serving as noematic 
descriptions are intentional contexts. In such contexts 
neither existential generalization nor substitution of 
extensionally equivalent expressions necessarily 
preserves truth value. If I were to identify the noetic 
component of my act of imagination by saying “I 
imagine an especially dry cappuccino”, it would not 
follow that there is an especially dry cappuccino. If I 
were to identify the noetic component of my 
perception by saying “I perceive the Klein bike 
frame” and, as a matter of fact, that bike frame is also 
the only piece of aluminium in the room, it would not 
follow that the noesis is about the only piece of 
aluminium in the room.  
 
In Appendix XII to On the Phenomenology of the 
Consciousness of Internal Time (1928/1991, pp. 130-
131), Husserl uses symbolic expressions to represent 
the thetic character and noetic component of a noesis. 
He apparently found these expressions well-suited for 
clarifying the structure of extremely complex acts. 
Since perceiving an object with some other person 
proves to be an experience of considerable 
complexity, I will introduce Husserl’s system for 
constructing these expressions here and employ this 
system in my analysis of joint attention in the third 
section.1 Upper case letters identify the act’s thetic 
character. Formulae enclosed within parentheses are 
noematic descriptions.2 These expressions appear 
1 Whether this system would be fruitful for other 
experiential analyses depends on both the nature of the 
experience to be analyzed and the interests of the 
researcher. My interest in joint attention may aptly be 
characterized as philosophical, since I mean to clarify 
what it is to perceive an object with others. Due to the 
intricacy of the phenomenon of joint attention, some 
means of formalizing my analysis is indispensable. 
Husserl’s system for symbolically representing the 
structure of intentional states appears to be an adequate 
instrument of formalization. 
2 They are not full noematic descriptions. In Ideas, Husserl 
takes a full noematic description to include a description 
of the thetic character of the noesis as well as other 
features of the object as it is experienced, such as the 
clarity with which it is perceived. Full noematic 
description thus includes description of what Husserl calls 
the “object in the How of its modes of givenness” (1913/ 
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immediately to the right of any thetic character letter. 
Lower-case letters abbreviate terms for objects other 
than noeses and only appear in parentheses (that is, 
they only appear as parts of noematic descriptions). 
For instance, 
 
(1)   P(o) 
 
represents perception of a physical object. “P” shows 
that the noesis is a perception, “(o)” serves as a 
noematic description, and “o” abbreviates “physical 
object”. It is possible to represent the structure of 
noeses of greater complexity by using additional 
parentheses and letters. The following expression, for 
example, represents remembering having perceived a 
physical object:  
 
(2)   M(P(o)).  
 
“M” indicates that the noesis is an act of 
remembering, and “(P(o))” is the noematic 
description. Since the act of remembering is about a 
perceptual experience, the noematic description 
includes a thetic character letter, “P”. The noematic 
description also includes “(o)”, indicating that the 
remembered perception is of a physical object. There 
is no limit to the number of noematic descriptions that 
might, in this manner, be nested within some other 
noematic description. Thus, imagining remembering 
having perceived a physical object could be expressed 
by 
 
(3)   I(M(P(o))).  
 
In this case, the noematic description “(o)” is part of 
the noematic description “(P(o))”, which is itself part 
of the noematic description of the act of imagining: 
“(M(P(o)))”. 
 
Two additional concepts of Husserlian phenomeno-
logy must be introduced before turning to a 
discussion of empathy: functional problems and 
horizons. A functional problem is a problem 
concerning how parts of a noesis or a plurality of 
noeses constitute consciousness of an object under 
some description. Phenomenological analyses which 
address functional problems are therefore called 
constitution analyses. Husserl addresses functional 
problems in Philosophy of Arithmetic, On the 
Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal 
Time and Thing and Space. These works respectively 
deal with the constitution of the consciousness of 
numbers, temporally extended phases of one’s own 
1983, p. 316). For my purposes, noematic description is 
confined to a description of the properties of the object 
apart from the How of its modes of givenness. Noematic 
description is confined, in Husserl’s terms, to the “object 
in the How of its determinations” (1913/1983, p. 314).  
experience, and three-dimensional visual objects. 
Phenomenological analysis of joint attention likewise 
addresses a functional problem: How is a phase of 
experience constituted so that I perceive an object as 
perceived with someone else?  
 
Husserl’s usual procedure is to begin with a noematic 
description of some phase of experience and work 
back to an account of constitutive noeses. It seems 
that, as Husserl became more practised in addressing 
functional problems, he became increasingly aware 
that the noematic description of some phase of 
experience often attributes more to the object of that 
phase than is, strictly speaking, presented in that 
phase. If the object of a perceptual experience falls 
under the description “coffee cup”, this implies that 
the perceptual experience is of an object with an 
underside; but as I look at this object from above, this 
phase of my perceptual experience does not properly 
present that side (Husserl, 1907/1997, p. 42). 
However, the underside of the object could be 
properly presented in another perceptual experience, 
one that I would have by lifting the object up and 
looking underneath. That possible noesis belongs to 
the horizon of the current phase of perceptual 
experience. Generally, the horizon of a noesis consists 
of all possible noeses such that one would remain 





The object of joint attention differs from other objects 
of perception insofar as it is perceived as a part of a 
broader situation that includes at least one other 
person who also perceives it. The intentional state in 
which one is aware of a jointly attended object must, 
therefore, include a noesis in which one is aware of 
another person as such (that is, a noesis in which one 
is aware of an object as falling under the description 
“person”). A detailed account of such awareness can 
be found in the early work of Husserl’s assistant at 
Freiburg, Edith Stein. 
 
3 This statement must be qualified. In the case of 
perceiving a coffee cup, I not only take the object to have 
an underside which is not presently properly perceived, 
but also to have a mark on the underside identifying its 
maker. I might not presently, though, take the object to 
have any particular mark on that side. If I were to pick up 
the cup and look at the underside, then I would properly 
perceive a particular mark. The description under which I 
perceive the object changes as that description becomes 
more determinate in the course of my experience. Yet, I 
continue to perceive the object as a coffee cup with a 
mark on the underside. The noematic descriptions of the 
two acts have this description in common. This common 
description is the description that remains unchanged in 
the course of the perceptions belonging to the horizon.  
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Unlike many contemporary cognitive psychologists, 
Stein maintains that it is possible to perceive other 
persons as such. It is not the case that one only 
perceives non-thinking, physical things and then 
infers that some of these things think in this way or 
that (perhaps on the basis of perceived similarities 
between one’s own body and the bodies of others). 
When I observe someone walk into a room, my 
experience no more involves an inferential process 
than when I perceive a cup. Rather, I am non-
inferentially aware of someone who exists here and 
now and is engaged in an action, an intentional 
behaviour. This awareness of the other person thus 
merits being described as perceiving the other 
person.4 
 
When I see someone walk into a room, I perceive the 
body of the other person not merely as a Körper but 
as a Leib, as a lived body (Stein, 1917/1989, pp. 40-
56). Whereas the Körper or physical body shares 
features common to other physical objects (for 
instance, position in space and time, extension in 
three-dimensions, causal relation to other physical 
objects), the lived body, whether my own or that of 
another, is a sensory field, a zero-point of orientation, 
an expressive field, and self-moving. If I perceive 
someone’s hand resting on a table, then I perceive his 
or her hand as touching the table. Moreover, I see the 
table as beneath his or her hand, and I see both the 
table and other objects in my perceptual field as 
above, below, in front, behind, left or right relative to 
the person’s body. In the other’s facial expression, 
gait and posture I can see emotions such as joy, and I 
see the other’s body as initiating movement rather 
than being moved. Perceiving the body of another 
person as sensing, as a zero-point of orientation, as 
expressive, and as self-moving, I must see that body 
as intentional. I see that body as perceiving other 
objects at various locations relative to itself, as joyous 
over some event, as intending some course of action. 
Perceiving the body of the other as a lived body, I 
perceive someone who is in intentional mental states. 
 
Although there is good reason to speak of perceiving 
someone act or perceiving their joy, a distinction 
should nonetheless be made between perception of 
other persons and perception of mere physical things. 
The horizon of a perception of a physical thing is 
quite different from the horizon of a perception of 
another person. Some of the features of a physical 
object are improperly perceived in any finite course 
of perceptual experience. But it is possible in 
principle for the presently improperly perceived 
aspects of the physical object to be properly 
4 I use the term “person” more loosely than Stein, who 
wishes to reserve the term for thinking beings of a 
particular sort: thinking beings that are accountable for 
their actions and responsive to objects of value.  
perceived. If I do not presently properly perceive the 
underside of the coffee cup, I can do so by picking it 
up and looking underneath. To use another of 
Husserl’s terms, improperly perceived features would 
then be given originarily, given in the most evident 
manner possible for that type of object. As embodied 
beings, other persons have spatial locations and are 
extended in three dimensions, and so some aspects of 
other persons must likewise be improperly perceived 
in any finite phase of perception. However, unlike 
mere physical objects, other persons possess features 
that cannot be originarily presented in any of my 
experiences: mental processes.  
 
Both Husserl and Stein maintain that each of us has 
first-person access to his or her own mental processes. 
Both phenomenologists, furthermore, privilege first-
person access to the mental. Mental processes are 
originarily presented in this way. But I cannot have 
first-person access to the mental processes of another 
person. This is not just impossible due to limited 
cognitive resources or limited time. It is conceptually 
impossible. The mental processes of another person 
would not be other than my own if I had first-person 
access to them. The noeses of the other are not, then, 
originarily given to me, but are, as Stein says, co-
originarily given to me (1917/1989, p. 57).5 I 
experience the other person as having features to 
which there is first-person access, but I am not the 
subject for whom there is such access. Owing to this 
peculiarity of the noeses in which one is aware of 
another person as such, this sort of intentional mental 
state requires a term distinguishing it from perception 
of mere physical things. In keeping with the 
psychology of her day, Stein chose the term 
“Einfühlung”, a term usually translated as 
“empathy”.6 
 
As Stein notes, empathy belongs to the class of 
noeses which permit iteration (1917/1989, p. 18). 
Remembering, reflecting and imagining also belong 
to this class. It is possible, for instance, to remember 
having remembered. It is likewise possible to 
5 I would modify the English translation, reading 
“Konoriginarität” as “co-originarity” instead of “con-
primordiality”.  
6 “Einfühlung” is a somewhat unfortunate term for the 
phenomenon in question. Transliterally, “Einfühlung” is 
“feeling-in”, which suggests a process of imaginatively 
putting oneself into the place of the other. Stein does 
recognize that some such process can play a role in 
making one’s experience of the other person more 
determinate. Imaginatively placing oneself in the position 
of the other person can help to more precisely identify the 
mental process that the other is taken to undergo. But 
Stein is clear that this does not always take place when 
one empathizes. Ordinarily, I simply see what others are 
doing, what emotional state they are in, and so forth, 
without engaging in any simulation.  
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empathize with another’s empathy. I might, for 
example, empathize with another person as 
empathizing with me insofar as I perceive a physical 
object. This would be second-order empathy. I might 
also empathize with another’s empathy for me insofar 
as I empathize with her insofar as she perceives some 
object. This would be third-order empathy. Fourth- 
and fifth-order empathy are also possible. In fact, as 
with other iterable noeses, higher order empathic 
noeses are possible ad infinitum.  
 
The Face-to-Face Situation  
 
In Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities 
(1922/2000), Stein recognizes that empathy plays a 
role in the constitution of Gemeinschaftserlebnisse, or 
communal experiences (p. 133). These are intentional 
mental states that one has with others. Together with 
others, I might mourn the loss of a leader, judge that a 
defendant is guilty, or intend to move a piano. I might 
also observe, with others, features of the directly 
perceivable environment. Joint attention, then, is a 
kind of communal experience. Unfortunately, Stein 
does not provide a constitution analysis of communal 
experience, preferring instead to use the concept of a 
communal experience to distinguish between various 
types of social collectivity. To make additional 
progress in the analysis of joint attention, we must 
turn to Alfred Schutz’s account of the face-to-face 
situation.  
 
In Phenomenology of the Social World (1932/1967), 
Schutz’s principal concern is to clarify fundamental 
concepts of Weberian sociology, including the 
concept of a social relationship. Schutz finds it 
necessary to distinguish between several different 
kinds of social relationship, one of which is the living 
social relationship. This relationship involves two or 
more persons, each of whom is in the perceptual field 
of each of the others. Each participant in the living 
social relationship not only perceives each of the 
others, but also perceives the body of each of the 
others as a lived body. In Stein’s terms, then, each 
participant in the living social relationship empathizes 
with each of the others. Finding the term 
“Einfühlung” objectionable, Schutz prefers to say that 
each takes up a Thou-orientation toward the others. In 
any case, the face-to-face situation is a situation 
comprising such participants. 
 
An analytically isolable moment of the face-to-face 
situation is the pure We-relationship. Schutz offers a 
series of increasingly precise accounts of the latter. 
He initially states that “The pure We-relationship is 
merely the reciprocal form of the pure Thou-
orientation, that is, the pure awareness of the presence 
of another person” (1932/1967, p. 168). But shortly 
thereafter he writes that “The pure We-relationship 
involves an awareness of each other’s presence and 
also the knowledge of each that the other is aware of 
him” (1932/1967, p. 168). The second statement is 
quite different from the first. It is possible that two 
persons are such that each empathizes with the other 
without being aware that his or her empathy is 
reciprocated. Imagine a situation in which each 
person sees the other but neither is aware of being 
seen by the other. In this case, there would be two 
first-order acts of empathy, but no second-order 
empathy. According to Schutz’s first statement, this 
would nonetheless count as a pure We-relationship. 
But, in the second statement, Schutz indicates that 
more is required: second-order empathy. If I am in a 
pure We-relationship with some others, then I must 
empathize with each of the others as empathizing 
with me, and each of the others must empathize with 
me insofar as I empathize with each of them. 
 
But this is still not an adequate characterization of the 
pure We-relationship. Discussing the example of a 
conversation, Schutz goes on to claim that: 
 
[A]s I watch you, I shall see that you are 
oriented to me, that you are seeking the 
subjective meaning of my words, my 
actions, and what I have in mind insofar as 
you are concerned. And I will in turn take 
account of the fact that you are thus 
oriented to me, and this will influence both 
my intentions with respect to you and how 
I act toward you. This again you will see, I 
will see that you have seen it, and so on. 
This interlocking of glances, this thousand-
faceted mirroring of each other, is one of 
the unique features of the face-to-face 
situation. We may say that it is a constitu-
tive characteristic of this particular social 
relationship. (1932/1967, p. 170) 
      
In addition to first- and second-order empathy, Schutz 
claims that third-order and fourth-order empathy are 
also constitutive features of the face-to-face situation. 
As I am talking with another person in a face-to-face 
situation, I empathize with the other as empathizing 
with me. The other mirrors my second-order empathy 
in her third-order empathy, an act that includes a 
noetic component by virtue of which her empathy is 
about my second-order empathy. Her third-order 
empathy is mirrored by my fourth-order empathy. 
Schutz adds “and so on”, indicating that still higher 
orders of empathy are constitutive of this relationship. 
Presumably, he means that the other, aware of my 
fourth-order empathy, mirrors this fourth-order act in 
her own fifth-order empathy; this is something of 
which I am aware, mirroring it in my own sixth-order 
empathy. Higher orders of empathy are constitutive of 
the face-to-face situation ad infinitum.  
 
In order to present the constitution analysis of the 
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pure We-relationship, I will make three additions to 
the system introduced in the first section of this paper 
for symbolically representing the structure of noeses. 
First, I will use subscripts to distinguish one’s own 
noeses from the noeses of a person with whom one 
empathizes. Suppose that I empathize with another 
person whom I take to empathize with me insofar as I 
perceive a physical object. Using subscripts, the 
structure of this act is represented by 
 
(4)  E1(E2(P1(o))).  
 
“E1” indicates both that this is an act of empathy and 
that it is my act rather than the act of the other person. 
“E2” serves as the first part of the noematic 
description of my empathy and indicates that the 
object of my empathy is the other’s empathy. The 
first part of the noematic description of the other’s 
empathy, “P1”, indicates that the other empathizes 
with me insofar as I have some perceptual experience. 
The “(o)” that follows “P1” shows that the other 
person takes me to perceive a physical object. As a 
second addition to the system, I will say that one 
noematic description explicates another noematic 
description if and only if a noesis cannot have the 
latter description without also having the former 
description. Suppose, for instance, that I perceive a 
Klein bike frame. It is impossible for me or anyone 
else to perceive a Klein bike frame without perceiving 
a bike frame. This means that the noematic 
description “bike frame” explicates the noematic 
description “Klein bike frame”. Finally, I will use 
“(N1)” to indicate that a noesis is self-referential. 
More precisely, “(N1)” indicates that the act with this 
noematic description is about the noesis represented 
by the whole expression in which “(N1)” appears. So 
understood, it may be expressed in English by “this 
noesis”. 
 
With these additions in place, I take myself to be in a 
pure We-relationship with some one other person just 
in case:  
 
   (5)   E1(E2(N1)),  where 
 (E1(E2(N1))) explicates (N1). 
 
(5) shows that my empathic act is about another 
person’s empathy. Thus, (5) represents the structure 
of my second-order act of empathy. Since (N1) is the 
noematic description of the other’s empathy, the 
other’s empathy is for my second-order empathy. 
Since (E1(E2(N1))) explicates (N1), the structure of my 
act of empathy may also be expressed by  
 
(6)  E1(E2(E1(E2(N1)))). 
 
But, if (E1(E2(N1))) explicates (N1), then 
(E2(E1(E2(E1(E2(N1)))))) explicates (E2(E1(E2(N1)))). 
Thus, the structure of my act of empathy may also be 
expressed by 
 
(7)    E1(E2(E1(E2(E1(E2(N1)))))). 
 
Explication may continue in this manner ad infinitum.  
 
Since the noematic description in (6) explicates that 
of (5), and the noematic description in (7) explicates 
that of (6), it is not possible for my empathy to have 
the noematic description given in (5) unless it has the 
noematic description given in (7). Indeed, it is not 
possible for my empathy to have the noematic 
description given in (5) unless it has all of the 
noematic descriptions that might be generated by 
continued explication. The analysis therefore 
accommodates Schutz’s description of the face-to-
face situation. It certainly involves thousand-faceted 
mirroring. Indeed, on the present analysis, that turns 
out to be an understatement. Notice, too, that the 
explication of the noematic description of my 
empathy is also the explication of the noematic 
description of the empathy that I attribute to the other. 
Thus, whenever I empathize with another person so 
that I attribute to the other an act of empathy for my 
own empathy, I take each of us to be in an intentional 
mental state that may be explicated to yield higher 
order acts of empathy without limit.7  
 
Schutz prefers to discuss examples of face-to-face 
situations in which participants engage in other-
affecting action (that is, action aimed at changing the 
intentional states of co-participants). A conversational 
partner engages in actions of this sort, as does a 
conductor leading members of an orchestra.8 Focused 
on other-affecting action in the face-to-face situation, 
Schutz tends to overlook the fact that these situations 
involve additional, co-perceived objects. This has led 
critics such as David Carr to reject Schutz’s analysis. 
According to Carr, “we” typically has to do with 
situations in which participants do something 
together, such as attending to an object in the 
7 Eugen Fink seems to have explicitly noted this feature of 
the face-to-face situation. In discussion with Schutz, Fink 
remarks that “the experience of the Other involves a 
reciprocal relationship: in experiencing the Other I 
experience concurrently his experiencing of me. But this 
reciprocal relationship is, taken strictly, not only a simple 
running back and forth from myself to the Other and from 
the Other to me. This reciprocal relationship allows, 
potentially, infinite reiteration. I can therefore say that I 
so experience the Other as he is experiencing me, and that 
he so experiences me as I am experiencing him, and this 
can go on infinitely. This potentiality need not be 
actualized; however, we have here an infinite reciprocal 
reflectibility somewhat like two mirrors placed one 
opposite the other reflecting into each other in infinite 
reiteration” (Fink, in Schutz, 1970, p. 85).  
8 Schutz deals with the latter case at some length in 
“Making Music Together” (1951/1964a).  
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perceptual field of each participant. Carr regards this 
third element, the object co-intended by participants, 
as a necessary condition of the pure We-relationship. 
 
Comprising two or more subjectivities, it 
requires a third thing, the common object, 
in order to come into being. ... Schutz’s 
description suggests a staring match or 
perhaps lovers gazing deep into each other’s 
eyes. But in a staring match the other 
disappears as other, and lovers who do not 
get on to other things besides gazing will 
not have much of an affair. (Carr, 1983, p. 
267)  
 
According to Carr, Schutz mischaracterizes the pure 
We-relationship precisely insofar as he leaves out the 
third element.  
 
Carr’s criticism is somewhat unfair, since the pure 
We-relationship is supposed to be an analytically 
isolable part of a more complex phenomenon. That is 
the point of calling it “pure”. Schutz stresses, for 
instance, that persons are never aware of each other 
simply as persons, but always under culturally and 
historically specific descriptions such as “professor”, 
“mail carrier” or “New Yorker”. He would also have 
accepted that face-to-face situations involve shared 
intentional states about a third element. Carr is 
correct, however, that Schutz’s account of triadic 
intentional systems (that is, face-to-face situations 
including a third element) is underdeveloped.  
 
Lack of attention to these systems is odd considering 
that Schutz’s first example of a face-to-face situation 
explicitly involves a jointly perceived object: 
 
Suppose that you and I are watching a bird 
in flight. The thought “bird-in-flight” is in 
each of our minds and is the means by 
which each of us interprets his own 
observations. Neither of us, however, could 
say whether our lived experiences on that 
occasion were identical. In fact, neither of 
us would even try to answer that question, 
since one’s own subjective meaning can 
never be laid side by side with another’s 
and compared. Nevertheless, during the 
flight of the bird you and I have “grown 
older together”, our experiences have been 
simultaneous. Perhaps while following the 
bird’s flight I noticed out of the corner of 
my eye that your head was moving in the 
same direction as mine. I could then say 
that the two of us, that we, had watched the 
bird’s flight. What I have done in this case 
is to co-ordinate temporally a series of my 
own experiences with a series of yours. But 
in doing so I do not go beyond the assertion 
of a mere general correspondence between 
my perceived “bird-in-flight” and your 
experiences. I make no pretence to any 
knowledge of the content of your subjective 
experiences or of the particular way in 
which they were structured. It is enough for 
me to know that you are a fellow human 
being who was watching the same thing that 
I was. And if you have in a similar way co-
ordinated my experiences with yours, then 
we can both say that we have seen a bird in 
flight. (Schutz, 1932/1967, p. 165) 
 
In this example, I see the bird in flight and notice that 
another person also perceives the bird in flight. This 
means that I empathize with the other. Empathizing 
with the other, I take her to likewise notice that I 
perceive the bird in flight. Thus,  
 
 (8)    P1(b) & E1(P2(b) & E2(P1(b))).
9 
 
But, in light of what Schutz goes on to say about the 
constitutive features of the face-to-face situation, (8) 
cannot be an adequate analysis. If co-perception of 
the bird in flight occurs in a face-to-face situation, 
then it must involve a pure We-relationship. The 
analysis of joint perceptual attention to the bird in 
flight must somehow incorporate the analysis of the 
pure We-relationship offered in (5). This may be 
accomplished as follows: 
 
(9) P1(b) & E1(P2(b)  & E2(N1)), where (P1(b) & 
   E1(P2(b)  & E2(N1))) explicates (N1).
10  
 
In that case, the structure of the total phase of my 
experience may be represented by  
 
   (10)   P1(b) & E1(P2(b)  & E2(P1(b) & E1(P2(b) 
    & E2(N1)))). 
 
This, in turn, may be represented by  
 
   (11)   P1(b) & E1(P2(b)  & E2(P1(b) & E1(P2(b) 
  & E2(P1(b) & E1(P2(b)  & E2(N1)))))). 
 
And so on. This suggests the following analysis of 
joint attention with one other person. Letting “( )” 
9 The recurrence of (b) in the conjuncts of (8) does not 
infer that the noematic descriptions of the two perceptions 
are completely identical. A noematic description of either 
perception would include description of features of the 
object which are only perceivable from the perspective of 
one perceiver at a time. Since two perceivers take up 
different perspectives at the same time, the complete 
noematic descriptions of their perceptions must differ. 
There may, nonetheless, be a core that they have in 
common, and (b) stands for this core description.  
10 For explanation of symbols, see my discussion of (4) - (7) 
above (p. 6).  
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serve as a variable taking noematic descriptions of the 
perceptual acts as values, consciousness of an object 
of joint attention is constituted by: 
 
(12)   P1( ) & E1(P2( )  & E2(N1)), where (P1( ) 




A critic might raise a number of objections to the 
proposed constitution analysis of joint attention. Of 
these possible objections, two strike me as most 
serious: (a) the analysis is incompatible with finite 





While it is plausible to suggest that human beings are 
capable of second-, third- and even fourth-order 
empathy, it may not seem plausible that we are 
capable of hundredth-order acts of empathy, let alone 
empathic acts of an infinite order. But, on the present 
analysis, all parties to joint attention have such 
intentional states, and, since joint attention is a 
pervasive, everyday phenomenon, intentional states of 
an infinite order must likewise be pervasive, everyday 
intentional states.  
 
Schutz appears to have anticipated an objection along 
these lines. Immediately following the passage in 
which he discusses thousand-faceted mirroring in the 
face-to-face situation, he notes that 
 
we must remember that this pure We-
relationship, which is the very form of 
every encounter with another person, is not 
itself grasped reflectively within the face-
to-face situation. Instead of being 
observed, it is lived through. The many 
different mirror images of Self within Self 
are not therefore caught sight of one by one 
but are experienced as a continuum within 
a single experience. (1932/1967, p. 170) 
 
It is one thing to undergo a phase of experience 
consisting of some intentional mental states, and 
another to reflect upon that phase of experience and 
thereby distinguish each of the states and their parts. 
The claim that (12) represents the structure of the 
experience of joint attention does not imply that 
persons jointly attending to an object are aware, in 
reflection, of each of the infinitely many components 
of their intentional states. That sort of reflective 
awareness is indeed impossible. 
 
Furthermore, if Husserl is right, then one has an 
intentional state of an infinite order whenever one is 
aware of the duration of one’s own experience. 
According to Husserl’s well-known account of the 
consciousness of internal time, one is always aware of 
that which is immediately present, that which is now. 
But this awareness of the immediately present is a 
dependent part of a more complex intentional state, a 
state that includes both awareness of that which has 
just occurred and awareness of that which is about to 
occur. In Husserl’s terms, awareness of that which is 
now is a dependent part of an intentional state 
including both retention of that which has been and 
protention of that which will be. Retention, more 
precisely, is retention of the intentional state of the 
preceding moment. That state had included awareness 
of that which was immediately present relative to it, 
as well as its own moments of retention and 
protention. This means that the moment of retention 
of one’s present intentional state is about the moment 
of retention of the immediately preceding intentional 
state. Any retention has this feature. Thus, the 
moment of retention belonging to awareness of the 
present is about a moment of retention which is itself 
about a moment of retention. The latter is also about 
another moment of retention, and so on. This explains 
why Husserl claimed that any temporally extended 
phase of experience is a continuum of continua (1928/ 
1991, p. 341). Internal time is a continuum, since for 
any two non-contemporaneous temporal points there 
is some other point that falls before one and after the 
other. But each intentional state in which one is aware 
of that which is immediately present may be 
characterized as a continuum, since its noematic 
description consists of an infinite series of nested 
noematic descriptions of the moments of retention of 
preceding intentional states.  
 
Husserl’s constitution analysis of the consciousness 
of internal time is certainly not unobjectionable. My 
point here is simply that Husserl himself maintained 
that every intentional state wherein one is aware of 
internal time involves retention of an infinite order. If 
phenomenologists reject the analysis of joint attention 
offered above on the grounds that finite minds cannot 
have intentional states of infinite order, then Husserl’s 
account of the consciousness of internal time should 
be rejected on the same grounds. Since consciousness 
of internal time founds every other intentional state, 
this would mean rejecting most, if not in fact all, of 
Husserl’s theory of intentionality. 
 
Objection (b)  
 
Even if it is possible for persons to have intentional 
states of the structure of (12), the proposed analysis 
might seem unnecessarily complex. While second- or 
even third-order empathy might very well be 
constitutive of joint attention, it might appear that 
empathic acts of higher order are not. 
 
But, as Christopher Peacocke (2005) points out, I 
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jointly attend to an object with some other person 
only if I take the other person to jointly attend to that 
object with me. It is safe to assume that I take myself 
to jointly attend to an object with some other person 
only if I am aware that each of us empathizes with the 
other. This means that I must have second-order 
empathy about the other’s first-order empathy. If 
second-order empathy is required for me to jointly 
attend to an object with the other, then the other must 
likewise have second-order empathy in order to 
jointly attend to that object with me. If I jointly attend 
to an object with some other person only on the 
condition that I am aware that the other jointly attends 
to that object with me, then I must be aware of the 
other’s second-order empathy. This means that I must 
have third-order empathy for the other’s second-order 
empathy. By parity of reasoning, the other must 
likewise be aware of my second-order empathy. I 
must be aware of this, and so forth. In short, if I 
jointly attend to an object with some other person 
only if I take the other to jointly attend to the object 
with me, then there is no upper limit to the order of 




In this paper I have attempted to address a short-
coming common to both contemporary psychology 
and the phenomenological tradition: lack of an 
analysis of joint attention. Making use of resources 
provided by Husserl, Stein, and Schutz, I have argued 
that consciousness of a jointly perceived object has 
the following structure:  
 
P1( ) & E1(P2( )  & E2(N1)), where (P1( ) & 
E1(P2( )  & E2(N1))) explicates (N1). 
 
The object of perception in a case of joint attention is 
grasped as part of a broader situation. That situation 
includes another perceiver. It also includes the 
intentional state wherein one is aware of that 
situation. This intentional state, then, must be about 
itself. It follows that the intentional state in which one 
is aware of perceiving an object with another person 
must have a noematic description that makes 
reference to that very state.  
 
This analysis raises a number of questions. First, is it 
adequate for human beings in early stages of 
cognitive development? If it is implausible as applied 
to the latter, does that mean that it is likewise 
implausible in the case of adults, or should infant 
joint attention be viewed as a similar but 
comparatively unsophisticated relative of full-blown, 
adult joint attention? Secondly, what are the 
principles governing inferential relations between 
noematic descriptions? I have maintained that one 
noematic description explicates another when the 
second description implies the first. But under what 
conditions does one noematic description imply 
another? Since noematic descriptions are intentional 
contexts, this is tantamount to asking for the rules of 
inference of an intentional logic. Finally, I have 
repeatedly made use of a system for symbolically 
representing the structure of intentional states. In 
order for this system to be really fruitful, the 
principles governing the construction of symbolic 
expressions should be precisely stated. These 
principles should include rules governing the 
formation of primitive expressions, as well as 
recursive rules for generating any other well-formed 
expression of greater complexity. It would be useful, 
in other words, to have an inductive definition of 
well-formed formulae of this system. That is, of 
course, far from what the present paper has been able 
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